My areas of interest are (broadly) in metaphysics, philosophy of action, and philosophy of religion.  My dissertation, for example, focused on metaphysical issues in free will/moral responsibility.  In it, I gave a defense of the so-called Direct Argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism.  I did this by defending the argument from some recent objections to both its inference rules as well as its key metaphysical assumptions.  I argued that the Direct Argument is vulnerable to one of these objections; so, I went on to devise a revised version of the Direct Argument that, I think, gets around this objection without sacrificing the Argument's inference rules or the spirit of its metaphysical assumptions.  
More recently, my research focuses on what I believe to be an important, yet almost completely unexplored, connection between the nature of truth, and the nature of moral responsibility.  I think that the nature of truth reveals some interesting things about the nature of moral responsibility, and the same is true the other way around.